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THE  
ALLIES  
AND

The Late Ministry

Defended against

FRANCE,

And the Present Friends of *France*.

In Answer to a Pamphlet, Intituled,  
*The Conduct of the ALLIES.*

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*Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia demens  
Dardanio, rebusque tuis———.*

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L O N D O N,  
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THE  
ALLIES  
AND

The Late Ministry

Defended against

FRANCE

And the Latest Friends of France



In Answer to a Pamphlet  
The Country of France

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THE  
ALLIES  
AND THE  
LATE MINISTRY  
DEFENDED,  
Against *FRANCE*, &c.

**T**HE Pamphlets that have been hitherto published in favour of an insecure and false Peace, have been most of them so meanly writ, that I have of late thought it lost Time to look into them; and by that means this Curious Piece of the *Conduct of the Allies and the late Ministers*, had escaped me, had it not been for the mighty Commendations *Abel* gives it in his *Post-Boy* of the 29th past; for whole Judgment I have so much Deference, that I could no longer delay looking into a Paper, in which I was to expect an infinite Number of undeniable Truths, and Truths indeed they are in *Abel's* Style, who has inverted the Sense of Words, and with his Friends is teaching the Nation a new Language, and to call things by the contrary Names to those they

B have

have hitherto been known by. I could not read even a few Pages of this great Performance, without thinking of the *Medley's* Story of the *Colliers* and the *Sailors*, and methinks I see this Writer in almost every Page engaging to his Friends in the *Colliers* Words, that *tho' we can't make our selves as clean as they are, we shall quickly make them as black as our selves.* This is plainly the Design of this elaborate Piece, with what Success, we shall see by going over it. But my Concern is not so much with the *late Ministry*, and the Arts us'd to blacken them, which are all in vain, and can only serve to make their Merit shine brighter in the End, which will infallibly be the Consequence of such an unjust and violent Persecution, as that with which they have been and are still pursu'd. What affects me in this and the like Attempts made upon the Reputation of the *late Ministry*, is the Purpose all this is chiefly intended to serve; and that is, to perswade us out of our Senses, to change all the Notions we have had of things for these twenty Years and more, and to give up contentedly all the Fruits of a most successful War in a mean inglorious Peace. I don't know what Effect this Master-piece of the Party may have on other People, but I must confess, a very hasty Reading of it has convinc'd me, that if what is advanc'd in it be the Sense of the Nation, a Peace is indeed necessary; for 'tis high time to make Peace with our Enemy, when we declare open War against all our Friends: Nay, could I suppose the Sense of the Nation would not be first asked in Parl—t upon so important a Subject, the Spirit of this Pamphlet would convince me of what some People have a good while suspected, that our Peace was already made, and that a Congress was to be held for no other End, but for us to act the Mediators, and tell our Allies what  
Terms



Terms we expect each of them should be contented with. For if we were not sure of Terms for our selves, to insult our Allies in so open a manner, and to expose the Weakness of the Nation, and our Inability to continue the War, *would, to use this Author's Words, not only be very indiscreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.* Which is one of the Reasons this Writer gives, p. 78. for not publishing his *Discourse sooner*; but sure 'tis even now too soon, if the Bargain be not already made. Another Reason for his coming out so late is, he says, *because he would give way to others, who might argue very well upon the same Subject from general Topicks and Reason, (that is, declaim well) tho' they might be ignorant of several Facts, which he had the Opportunity to know,* from which alone a true Judgment can be made, and which he therefore knew how to misrepresent; for I hope to convince every impartial Reader, that is all the Use this Writer has made of his great Knowledge.

These are the two Reasons this Author thinks fit to give for *not publishing his Discourse sooner*, to which I will venture to add a third, as true a one as the last, and much truer than the first; for no body can believe he declined appearing sooner, because it might be *dangerous at this juncture to expose the ill Condition we are in*, for that his Friends have already done in very ample manner; and if that were a Reason for not publishing two Months ago, 'tis as good a Reason still, unless, as I have said, the Bargain be made. The principal Reason therefore for publishing his *Discourse* no sooner, was to wait the critical Minute, which might be most likely to give it its effect. The great Skill of Dealers in *Political Lies* consists in knowing how to time them nicely, and to proportion the Strength of the Colours to the Length of the Time 'tis

intended they should last. How much the Welfare or Misery of this Nation depends on the first Resolutions of the next Session, no body wants to be told ; on them depends a good or bad Peace, provided it be not a thing done: 'Tis therefore of great consequence to the Promoters of an ill one, to have a Flood of Lies in readiness to let out of a sudden on those, whom 'tis so much their Interest to surprize into wrong Measures, by the most artful Disguises they can use. It was with this View this Book did not make its appearance, till the Day appointed for the Session ; in hopes the Members, deluded by the false Lights of so many pretended Facts, would go whither they should lead, without suspecting they were going wrong : And because there was, for Reasons of State, a Possibility that the Session might still be put off a few Days longer, as it has proved in the Event, it was contrived to be of such a Length, as might find many Readers work for some Days, or at least make it impossible to give a timely Answer to it before the Resolutions were taken, which it was designed to influence.

But the Strength and Force of Argument, with which the opposite Side of the Question has been maintain'd in many Pamphlets, the evident Goodness of that Cause, the gross Misrepresentations of this Writer and his Friends, and the many Marks that appear throughout, of Malice and Falshood ; the great Court that is made to *France*, and the strange rude Treatment of our best Allies, make me greatly hope, that these new Politicians will find themselves extremely disappointed ; and that a *British* Parl — t will not, in a Matter of the utmost Consequence, believe what comes from so suspected a Hand, without hearing both Sides, and examining into the Facts themselves.

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As this Writer finds his Account in coming out late, and being long to serve an ill Cause, I shall, to serve a good one, take the contrary Course, and be as short as possible, that I may not appear to be too late in the Defence of that, which, when 'tis once gone, is never to be retrieved.

I shall, therefore, pass over many Pages of this Book, which contain nothing in them but general Reflections and Repetitions of the same thing; of which, in this elaborate Piece of Scandal, there are many Instances, as if it were not enough to misrepresent one Fact once, but it must be made, by Repetition, two or three; by which Artifice, all the Dirt that is thrown is multiplied, that the Allies, and the late M——y might be sure to look black enough.

After many wise Reflections upon War in general, in order to tincture the unwary Reader's Mind with useful Prejudices for what is to follow, this Author descends to consider those Wars *England* has been engaged in since the *Conquest*; upon which, he wisely observes, That while we make War in our own Country, we carry no Money out of it; a great Commendation, this, of Civil Wars! Even the *Dutch Wars*, in K. Ch. II's Reign, did not carry out any Money, nor did it leave any Debts upon the Nation: And thus this Reign is past over, without any other Remark on't, but that those Wars were carried on under a very corrupt Administration; so corrupt a one, that I hope this Nation, in many Years to come, will not have seen above one more such: 'Tis to this Administration we owe the Change of the Balance of *Europe*, and the great Difficulties which the exorbitant Power of *France* has since reduc'd us to. Those *Dutch Wars*, as this Writer observes, were much to the Dishonour of the Crown; and so *Dutch Wars* very probably will always be, though this  
 Author,



Author, in many Places, is founding an Allarm, raising all the ill Blood he can, and infusing Jealousies between the two Nations, whose Interest it is to be in the most inseparable Union. Speaking of our Successes in *Flanders*, p. 28. he says, *We are destroying many Thousand Lives, exhausting all our Substance, not for our own Interest, not for a thing indifferent, but perhaps to our own Destruction; we may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more sensibly than all the Consequences we imagine from the Dominions of Spain in the Duke of Anjou: We have conquer'd a noble Territory for the States, &c.* And, p. 71. *We, instead of labouring to make them safe (the Dutch) must beggar our selves to render them formidable.*

Had K. Charles instead of those scandalous Wars against the *Dutch*, exerted himself with Vigour against *France*, the Expence of a few Millions then would have sav'd us an hundred since; but by his Treaties with *France*, and his Wars with *Holland*, he shew'd he was not in the true Interest of his Country: nor can any Prince be so, who, in succeeding Times, shall tread in the same Steps: Even his Parl — t, as corrupt as they were, could not be brought to give Countenance to such ruinous Measures; much less can any other M — y expect a *British* Parl — t will desert the Interest of the Nation, when its Liberties are establish'd upon so much a better Bottom than they were at that time.

From the *Dutch* Wars our Author passes to the *Revolution*, when a general War broke out, to check the ambitious Designs of *France*; and here the Emperor, the *Dutch* and *England*, were Principals. A little after we are told, *That the Ground of this War, as to the Part we had in it, was to make France acknowledge the late King, and to recover Hudson's Bay.* That these were two of the particular Ends we propos'd by the War, is true; that it was the whole, is not true;

for



for as he says himself, the War was general, to check the *Ambition of France*, who had been for thirty Years encroaching upon their Neighbours, and had shewn they could be bound by no Treaties; to check this *Ambition*, therefore, was a general Concern, and a just Cause of entering into the War, to prevent that *universal Monarchy*, which had been compassed long since, if we had tamely sat still; for the K. of *France* had begun the War by the Invasion of the *Empire* the Summer before the *Revolution*; and had the Revolution been prevented or disappointed, there had then been an End of the Liberty of *Europe*, and of our own too; and therefore I beg Leave to observe by the Way, that the End of that War was not chiefly to settle the *Revolution*, which the Enemies of it would insinuate; 'twas necessary for the Preservation of our selves, and the Powers in Alliance with us, who, without us, would have made no stand against *France*, and we must have necessarily been involv'd in the same Ruin with them. And to pretend the Sea was neglected, and the greatest Part of six Millions annually employed, to enlarge the Dutch Frontier, because the King was a General and not an Admiral; and although King of England, a Native of Holland, is all ill grounded Scandal, that has at the bottom no Foundation; the Increase of the Power of *France*, upon the Continent, made it necessary to make the greatest Efforts against him there; and all that were made, were, as appear'd by the Event, too little: Nor did that Service, after all, employ the greatest part of 6 Millions, as any body may see by the Estimates laid before the Commons every Sessions, for the *Flanders-War*. As to the Fleet, 'twas so far from being neglected, that we not only recovered the Disgrace we received in the beginning of the War off of *Beachy*, but afterwards in a successful Engagement

we made such a Destruction of the Naval Strength of *France*, that they never appear'd again at Sea all that War. But let us see what an Account is given of the End of this War, *After the Loss of an hundred thousand Men, and a Debt remaining of twenty Millions, a Peace was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to us, and clogged soon after by the famous Treaty of Partition.* I would be glad to know, whether *England* has no Advantage in a War they engage in to check the Ambition of *France*, if *France* be considerably weaken'd by the advantageous Terms given to the *Empire and Holland*? Whether those Terms are not transferring so much Strength from the Side we would weaken to those we would support? And if so, whether the Reason of going into such a War is not answer'd, and we may not properly be said to find our Account in it? But had it not been to raise an Odium against the late King, this Author would not have said, *that War was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to us*; for he very well knows, it was a very disadvantageous Peace to the Allies, very short of what they propos'd, and the natural Effect of an unsuccessful War; and why that War succeeded no better, he can tell us too if he pleases: It was the Effect of the Opposition of a discontented Parry, of unhappy Misunderstandings between Prince and People, of late Sessions, and ill Trade, and a bad Credit, which was the necessary Consequence of the rest. These and the like Causes made it impossible for the King to push the War with Vigour; and if *France* made better Offers to put an End to it, than the Confederates from their ill Successes could expect, 'twas no Secret what that was for, 'twas that he might be at leisure to pursue his Designs upon the *Spanish Monarchy*, which succeeded  
but

but too well by his Management of the *Partition-Treaty*, which this Author knows the King was forced into, as the lesser of the two Evils, the Nation in all Appearance being neither in Temper, nor, as he was made to believe, in Condition to begin a new War; and having no body of Troops that could be able to make Head against *France* upon the King of *Spain's* Death, who was in a most languishing Condition at the time the *Reswick-Treaty* was made; which was the true Reason the King of *France* was in so much haste to put an end to that War, and promis'd so readily to give up many Places to *Spain*, which, if his Design on that Monarchy succeeded, was in Effect giving to himself. But as to the Advantages to the Empire and *Holland*, I know none he gave the last but an advantageous *Tariff*, of which he never executed one Article; and for the *Empire*, People must have short Memories to forget, how he embroiled them by the 4th Article about Religion, with what Contempt he treated the Emperor about *Strasburg*, and how he after the Peace refused to surrender *Old Brisac*, till he had built *New Brisac* just over against it, which was to all Purposes defeating the Design of the Restitution of that important Place. But to comfort our selves for the Loss of Men and Money in this War, this Writer could have told us, that Monsieur *Vauban* in his *Disme Royal* reckons *France* at the end of that War weaker by two Millions and more than before, and gives us such a miserable Account of the Poverty of the People, and of the Increase of the King's Expence, beyond what the Kingdom could bear, as might be some Consolation to us at the end even of such a War; if the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy had not been built upon the Peace that concluded it. In this War began the Custom among us of borrowing Mil-

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lions



*lions upon Funds of Interest.* This is represented in this and other Places of this Book as a *most detestable Project*, a Plot to ruin the landed Interest, and there is nothing bad enough to be said of it. Sometimes 'tis imputed to *the Security* of a new Prince not firmly settled on the Throne, sometimes to a Design of a few cunning Men, to involve the Nation in Debt, and enrich themselves; sometimes to the ambitious Views of a M—y. Any Reason, in short, is given for it, but the true one; for 'tis certain, this Method of raising Money was not taken up by Choice, but Necessity: There were a Set of Men in Parl—t at that time, whose Merit it was to oppose the Court right or wrong; and there was nothing these Patriots so much abhorred, as any thing that look'd like an Excise, which the Nation has insensibly in great measure come into since; and had they done so at first, there might have been almost the same Sums rais'd without any Debt upon the Nation. And after all, there is nothing in this Method of raising Money by Funds of Interest, but what all other Nations engag'd in these Wars have come into as well as our selves, and before us; so that in this respect we are upon the same foot with other People, but so much better as our Debts are less than those either of *France* or *Holland*, as every body knows that is acquainted with foreign Affairs, and has any Insight into Political Arithmetick.

Our Author having brought down his History to the present War, and spent six Pages in raising as much Dust as he thought necessary to shew his Tricks in without being presently discover'd, which, considering how ignorant most Readers are of foreign Affairs, how generally we love Scandal, how weary we all are of a long War, and how pleasing that has made the very Name of Peace, to those  
whom



whom Sounds perswade as well as Sense, is no very hard matter for a Person much less skilled in the Arts of Jugling, than this Writer must be allowed to be. After a Prologue of 20 Pages, this Farce of a History opens with this noble Proposition, *That no Nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domestick Enemies, or treated with so much Insolence, Injustice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.* And this he undertakes to make appear by plain Matters of Fact.

Tho' I can't by any means consent my Country should be ruined by an ill Peace, when we have so fair a Prospect of a good one, which is the plain Design of this Writer and his Friends; yet if this Proposition can be prov'd, I will readily consent the late M——y should be given up to the Fury of their Enemies, provided the same Justice may be done on their Accusers, if it cannot.

The Proposition to be proved is indeed at first sight so strange a Paradox, that the Undertaker must have a great Opinion of his Skill in secret History to venture at it; and I have reason to think this is not his first Essay: He is much improv'd since this time Twelve-month, and now boldly affirms the grossest Falsities, which he then scarce dared to hint at. Then the M——y only were attack'd, and that upon some Points only, the Allies were spared, or rather good Words were given them; but now there is nothing too bad to be said of the late M——y; all is wrong in their Administration from beginning to end; and, for their Comfort the Allies are as bad as themselves. In short, both Allies and Ministers are Fools and Knaves, and all the Virtue and Wisdom in the World lies in two or three Hands, where no body before ever thought there was any; but with this surprizing Difference, that

Affairs have for many Years succeeded to a Miracle under this sottish and corrupt Management, when 'tis next to a Miracle if this new Virtue and Wisdom do not ruin us. But to come to our Author's Proofs of what he has with so much Truth and Modesty advanced; he will make his Proposition good by proving these three Points.

" First, That against all manner of Prudence or  
 " common Reason we engag'd in this War as Prin-  
 " cipals, when we ought to have acted only as Aux-  
 " liaries.

" That we spent all our Vigour in pursuing  
 " that part of the War which could least answer  
 " the End we propos'd by beginning it; and made  
 " no Efforts at all where we could have most wea-  
 " ken'd the Common Enemy, and at the same time  
 " enrich'd our selves.

" Lastly, That we suffer'd each of our Allies to  
 " break every Article in those Treaties and Agree-  
 " ments by which they were bound, and to lay the  
 " Burden upon us.

Every one of which Propositions I will shew to be scandalously false, and consequently the Proposition they are to prove is no less so. And the hard Words of *Folly, Temerity, Corruption, and Ambition*, can properly belong to none but those from whom they come.

His first Proposition, That to engage in this War as Principals, is against all manner of Prudence or common Reason, is so very new and extraordinary, that I heartily congratulate him upon this great Discovery. He is the first Writer I have met with of his Side, who has had the Hardiness to speak so plain, tho' 'tis what I have long suspected to be their meaning; and 'tis no wonder they are in so much haste to get out of the War any how, since they now openly declare 'twas wrong to go into it. This is a Key to the whole Book,

Book, and nothing that follows, no Reflections on the late M——y, no ill Usage of our Allies, no Endeavours to explain away Treaties, no absurd Opinion about Credit, not even his thinking the Fall of Stocks upon the Change of the M——y, *a good Omen*, can seem strange after such an extravagant Declaration as this, which contradicts the Sense of all the Parliaments we have had, since the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy, the unanimous and constant Sense of the Queen and her Allies, the Sense even of the present Parliament, nay what's more, the Sense even of these Writers themselves a Year ago. For then they had not brought themselves to think at this absurd rate, or did not think it time to tell the Nation so. That the Justice and Necessity of the War has been all along allowed and insisted on by the Queen and her Allies, and by all our Parliaments till this last, has been shewn by so many Collections of Speeches, Addresses and Votes, as well as by the Articles of the several Treaties made with our Allies, that I shall not repeat any thing that has been already publish'd of this kind, but shall take notice rather of what has not been so much observed, and that is the Sense of the present Parliament, especially of the Lords in their *Representation* presented to her Majesty the 10th of *February* last, in the second Paragraph of which, they applaud her Majesty's *engaging generously* in this War for asserting the Liberties of *Europe*, and the Rights of the House of *Austria* to the *Spanish* Monarchy, which had been wrested from them by the Artifices and Usurpations of the French King, when a Prince of that Illustrious Family came to her Majesty for Refuge against Oppression; and that her Majesty had received him into her Protection, moved thereunto not only by her own innate Goodness, but by the

Voice



'Voice of her People too, who were ready to sa-  
 'crifice their Lives and Treasure for the Support of  
 'her Majesty in Defence of so righteous a Cause:  
 'And as the Fruits of a successful War they mention  
 'the Honour of her Majesty, the Safety, Wealth and  
 'Prosperity of her own Dominions, and the lasting Peace  
 'of Europe. And the Commons in the second Pa-  
 ragraph of their Representation speak of the absolute  
 'Necessity of carrying on the War, to say nothing  
 'of the Assurances both Houses gave her Majesty  
 'in their Addresses at the Opening of the Sessions.  
 So that our Author's first Proposition is directly con-  
 trary even to the present Parliament, which I re-  
 commend to the Consideration of those Gentle-  
 men, who have in due Veneration and Esteem the  
 Sentiments of this P——t, how much soever they  
 may undervalue all preceding ones; tho' I can't  
 but put them in mind that there has been even in  
 their own Opinion one P——t this Reign as  
 good as the present; I mean the first, which yet  
 declar'd their Sense of the Justice of the War, and  
 the Necessity of pushing it with Vigour, as much as  
 any that came after them; but this Writer's Affir-  
 tion is not only contrary to the Sense of the present  
 P——t, but I presume I may add of the present  
 M——y last Session, since no body can have any  
 Pretence to suspect that their Sentiments upon this  
 Point differ'd at that time, whatever they may do  
 now: But what makes the monstrous Absurdity of  
 this Proposition still more evident, is, that 'tis incon-  
 sistent with the Sense of these Writers themselves a  
 Year ago. For in the many scandalous Pamphlets of  
 that memorable Year, which came no doubt out of  
 the same Mint with that now before me, there is not  
 one word to condemn our manner of engaging in  
 the present War, as imprudent or unreasonable, or  
 ill advised; and yet those Writers have sufficiently  
 shewn,



shewn, they wanted no Inclination to blacken the late M——y, their Malice was workt up to the last pitch, and 'twas extremely for their purpose to say all the ill of them they could devise, true or false; and by what they have said, one may be sure they left nothing unsaid, which they thought cou'd hurt their Reputation; and the Silence of such keen Adversaries must be allowed to be a considerable Argument, that they did not then think the engaging the Nation in the present War any Crime; and that such an Accusation was at that time too gross to pass upon the Nation.

But how now comes that which was right a Year ago to be exclaim'd against as *imprudent* and against all Reason, and to be made a capital Crime in the late M——rs? How comes it to be now declar'd, that the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy was none of the Ends that engag'd *Britain* in the present War, that her Majesty by the Grand Alliance is not oblig'd to it, and that 'tis Madness to think of it? How can this mighty Difference in the same Persons in so short a time be reconciled? Is it that they have really chang'd their Sentiments, and by the Force of wrong thinking for a Twelve-month together, have at last brought themselves to be in love with such absurd Notions, in opposition to their own Sense, as well as to that of all Mankind besides? Or are they indeed not in these Sentiments themselves, but think it convenient to impose them on the People, as soon as they are prepar'd by the Poison they have with so much Diligence for some time infused into them? If this last be the case, I confess, a Twelve-month is but a reasonable time to prepare a Nation for such Absurdities; a Nation, not trained up in Ignorance and Slavery, can't bear to have all the Notions they have been bred to, with respect to publick Affairs,

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contradicted at once; a free People, that have been used to reason about *Liberty*, and *Trade*, and *Alliances*, and *Peace*, and *War*, can't of a sudden resign their Understandings implicitly to the strange Dictates of their new Masters: 'Twill require time to manage such a People to their own turn; and if this mighty Change can be compassed even in a Year, they must be allowed to be able Politicians. And this, I confess, I take to be the true Reason why these Secrets in Politicks have not been produced sooner. Things were not ripe for it; and even now, it seems, they don't think fit to bring these monstrous Propositions into the light, without a Guard of Reasons, such as they are, before to make way for them, and another to secure the Rear. To judge of the Strength and Goodness of these Reasons, I shall take them out of the confused Order they are in, which is not confus'd by Chance, 'tis the *most proper* for the Nature of Deceit, and most agreeable to the Genius of the Author, if I am not extremely mistaken in my Guess of him. The Substance then of what he urges in Proof of his first Proposition is this: *Upon the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the Monarchy of Spain, in breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Question here in England was, whether the Peace should be continu'd, or a new War begun?* Let me add, That the King had a little before chang'd hands, and taken in a *Tory* M——y, but was thought to be still influenc'd very much by those he had parted with. The new M——rs and their Friends were against beginning a new War, *by reason of the Debts and Difficulties we labour'd under*, that France was now much more formidable than in the last War, by the Accession of the whole *Spanish Monarchy*, and the Alliance of *Cologne* and *Barvaria*: By which means he reckons the Allies would be weaker upon the Balance by  
one

one hundred and twenty thousand Men than last War, *the Success of which we had no Reason to boast of.* He might have added, that besides *Cologne* and *Bavaria*, *France* had engag'd on their Side the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*; but the first perhaps was pass'd over, because the Mention of it would make too much for the Honour of the then Emperor, who had the Courage to begin this War alone, and made a successful Campaign in *Italy* against the whole Power of *France*, and made his way into the *Milaneze*, between the Duke of *Mantua* on one side, and the Duke of *Savoy* on the other: 'Tis hard to say, whether the Courage or Wisdom of the Court of *Vienna* in this Enterprize was most wonderful; for 'twas impossible to begin a War under greater Disadvantages: It put the Emperor to a vast Expence, which his Condition could very ill bear, and ruined a Body of the bravest Troops and best Officers then in *Europe*; but he thought all was at stake, and therefore was resolv'd to venture all: The Justice and Necessity of his Case, which would draw the Fate of all *Europe* after it, made him wisely judge, that *England* and *Holland* would not be idle Spectators, while *France* was grasping at Universal Monarchy, and, I may say, had it in her Hands. Thus he judg'd, and thus it prov'd: And to that glorious Enterprize of his we owe it, that there was room for beginning a new War, without which the Liberty of *Europe* had been long since lost without Retrieve; and therefore if some of the Failures charged on the House of *Austria* in the Sequel of this Libel, were as great as this Author would have them thought, this first and wonderful Campaign in *Italy* makes no small Amends, and at the same time accounts for them; for it wasted so much of the Emperor's Treasure, as he has no way been able to make up; and that great but necessary Expence there has



unavoidably made all their Efforts weaker ever since.

This impartial Writer sinks this Campaign upon us, and that we might not think of it, declines mentioning the Duke of *Mantua* and the Duke of *Savoy* here in their proper Place. But there was another Reason for his not mentioning the last and the King of *Portugal*. 'Twas very much to his Purpose to tell us, they were in Alliance with *France*, since that increased so much the more the Danger of the War; but then it would have led his Reader to reflect on the Wisdom and Abilities of the M——y he was to run down, that they were able to bring off from *France* two such considerable Allies: And it would at the same time have furnish'd an Answer to the Objections he makes to the Treaty entered in with *Portugal*; for can any body suppose a Prince actually engag'd in Alliance with *France* could be brought off, without offering him very favourable Articles, or engaging to secure him as effectually as we could against the Resentments of the side he left, whose Nearness and Naval Force he had great Reason to be apprehensive of; and therefore if such an Alliance was worth having, as I dare say every body then thought it was at any rate, 'twas not only just and reasonable, but absolutely necessary to give him all possible Assurances of Protection: Which could no way be done but by a Squadron of Ships at his Service. This was the least we could promise; and no body but a Fool can imagine, that this was giving up a part of our Fleet to his Caprice or Humour, as this Author would insinuate, so as that the Queen or her Admirals would not use their own Discretion, if he pretended to send our Ships upon ridiculous or unreasonable Services; which could not be supposed to be within the Meaning of these Articles.

The



The *Portugal* Alliance, when rightly understood, is highly for the Honour of the late Ministry, and therefore the true State of it is concealed. And there was also a good Reason for taking no Notice in this Place of the Duke of *Savoy*. This was another great Service of the late M—y; but 'tis plain this Author acts with still further Views, with regard to that Prince; for this is not the only proper Place in which he omits to mention him; he might have found, had he been in Humour, as many Faults in our Treaty with *Savoy*, as in that with *Portugal*; for as the gaining him from *France* was a great Point, so very advantageous Articles were granted for it; how then could he escape the Lash of this unmerciful Cenfor? This we may be sure is not for nothing; there is a Mystery in it which perhaps I may explain before I end these Papers: Yet at present I shall only say, that in this Author's Scheme some use is hop'd to be made of him towards divesting the House of *Austria* of their Right to the *Spanish* Monarchy, and by that Means facilitating an ill Peace.

Having thus accounted for our Author's Silence with respect to the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*, when the Mention of them was so much for his Purpose, they being all in Alliance with *France* at the beginning of the War, I proceed now to consider the Force of his Argument. The Debts of the Nation and the Power of *France* were the Arguments the *Tories* used against engaging in a new War. Very well! and they were the same Arguments that frightned the King into the *Treaty of Partition*. Yet his Ministers were impeach'd upon a bare Presumption of their having advised it. But *France* by the actual Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy and the Alliances it had made, was so much an Over-match for us, that human probability ran with mighty odds on that side; and in that case,

says our Author, *nothing under the most extreme Necessity should force any State to engage in a War.* I say so too ; but then I affirm, that was our Case, and so thought all those who advised entering into the War ; *They alledged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of Spain, that we could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was subject to a Prince of the Bourbon Family, nor any Hopes of preserving the Balance of Europe, because the Grandfather would in effect be King, while his Grandson had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of pursuing his Design of Universal Monarchy.*

The Arguments for entering into the War may be set in a stronger Light, but I am content to take them in his own Words : The Preservation of our Trade, of our *Establishment*, and of the *Balance of Europe*, which could none of them be tolerably safe while the *Spanish Monarchy* was suffer'd to be in the House of *Bourbon*, were of the utmost Concern for the Welfare of the Nation, and *nothing*, to use this Author's Words, *but the most extreme Necessity should force a Nation tamely to submit to such a Usurpation*, as in all human Probability must in a few Years bring on them certain Destruction. But that we were not under that extreme Necessity, the Event, God be thank'd, has sufficiently shewn. To set now this matter in a true Light, whether we should enter into a new War or not, was a point that deserved the most careful Consideration, a great deal might be said on both sides ; the Danger of suffering *France* to continue in the quiet Possession of the *Spanish Monarchy* was allow'd on all Hands, the Dispute was, whether there was a possibility of preventing by a War the Danger that threatned us ? Those who were against a War, thought of two Evils the least was to be chosen, that if we kept Quiet, the Danger was at some Distance, and the greater the Distance, the more room for some lucky Chance that might alter the

the Face of things, and with these Reasons and Fears Party and Passion mixed themselves, as it almost always happens in free Countries. The *Tory* M——y the King had taken found they were but upon a very uncertain foot, and that he did not heartily go into them. This made them apprehensive he would in a little time change Hands again, as in Effect he began to do before he dy'd, that then the Administration would return into that Set of Men, that they had the greatest Aversion to. All the ill Consequences that arose from the ill Humour of the Parliaments, from their Slowness to give Money, and the Insufficiency of the Funds, which unavoidably occasion'd high Interest and great Discounts, were imputed solely to these Ministers; and while Credit was in such an ill State at home, 'twas impossible any thing could go well abroad; the Differences would have continu'd between the King and his Parliaments, and the Publick Credit and the Management of the War must have been upon the same ill foot as before, in spite of all the M——y could do. This made wise and honest Men exceeding fearful of the Consequences of entering into a new War: in which 'twas impossible to succeed without Credit and Union at home, and that under these Appearances there was little Hopes of. Besides, the extreme ill State of the King's Health made it impossible for him to command in *Flanders* himself; and they did not then know how the Place of so great a General could be supply'd; or at least his Authority and Influence over the *States* and a *Confederate* Army they thought could not: And his Death at the beginning of a new War they apprehended would throw all things into Confusion, and dissolve the Alliances, that his Credit and Reputation were the chief Cement of. 'Twas these Considerations made the *Tory* M——y and their Friends think, that upon the whole a War was not advisable,



visable, but others were of another Mind, they had a better Opinion both of the King himself and his M—s, and hoped that things might be managed better than they had been ; that the Greatness of the Danger we were expos'd to, would make us lay aside our Heats, and unite us at home, and that the People wou'd join heartily with the King, and enable him with effectual Supplies to carry on the War with Vigour, and then Credit would revive of Course, and all things would go well, which ever side he took into the M——y. And in a new Parliament called to give his Majesty the fresh Sense of the Nation upon this important Subject, tho' their Affection to the King appear'd by their Impeachments towards the latter end of the Session, they advis'd him to make Alliances, and assur'd him, he should be supported in them. But what is of most weight in this Question, was the King's own Sense of it. He knew the Affairs of *Europe* better than all his M——y together, and was a very good Judge of the Interests of the Empire and the House of *Austria*, of the Power of *France*, and of the imminent Danger *England* and *Holland* were expos'd to by the Seizure of the *Spanish* Monarchy. And he us'd his utmost Endeavours to make the Nation sensible of the Necessities of a War, which could alone prevent the Ruin of them and the *States*. And that the King was very sincere in his Opinion, we are very sure from the Treaty of *Partition*, which sufficiently shew'd he had no mind to enter into a new War, if it could possibly be avoided. For that was plainly the Design of that Treaty, the ill Success of the former War, the Difficulties his Affairs were perplex'd with, the Heats and Divisions of his Subjects, the Treatment he met with from his Parl——ts and his own ill Health, all together broke his Spirits, he had no Heart to think of a new War ; but was willing to pur-

purchase Rest at any rate for the Remainder of his Days. And this he has been very liberally upbraided with by those who were so angry at the *Partition Treaty*, that he gave up the Interest of the Nation to his own Ease, and did not care what became of the rest of the World, so he were but quiet himself. But if this Prince, who was so weary of War, so desirous to be at ease, if he was of Opinion a new War was upon the Violation of the *Partition-Treaty* absolutely necessary, his Judgment will have more Weight with all impartial Men, than all that this Author or his Friends at this Distance can say to the contrary. To dispute now of the Necessity of the War, is the same thing as to dispute the Necessity of the *Revolution*; we are sure those who were best Judges of both, when things were fresh, and they had the full View of all before them, thought both necessary; but when the Distance of our Dangers has made us forget the Greatness of them, we are to be taught that neither was so, by designing Men, who take Advantage of our Ignorance or Forgetfulness to impose on us the falsest Reasonings, by a Misrepresentation of Facts, which the Generality of Readers are to judge of at ten or twenty Years Distance, when many of the most material Circumstances are forgot; and they are to judge by such only as these Writers think fit to give them, and those are pickt and cull'd at their own Pleasure, and either are partially represented, or quite alter'd, as best serves their Turn. But honest and impartial Men will be upon their Guard; they won't be beat out of their Senses, and believe every absurd Notion that shall be started, because they don't distinctly remember all that relates to a Matter that was transacted many Years since. A Man that was once perswaded of the Necessity of the War, has as much Right to maintain his Conclusion that it is necessary, though

though he does not carry in his Mind exactly all the Proofs of it, as a Mathematician has to abide by a Proposition in *Euclid*, though he has forgot some part of the Demonstration; he is sure he could demonstrate it once, and therefore is satisfied 'tis true, tho' he can't readily prove it, it being many Years perhaps since he look'd into the Proof of it. And as it would be great Impudence to tell such a Man a Proposition is false that he knows is true, and to go about by specious Arguments to make him believe the contrary, 'tis no less impudent or absurd to pretend to prove at this time of Day to a true *Britain*, that there was no Necessity for our entering into the War, when we are under the greatest Conviction of the Truth of the contrary; and it has been so long the unanimous and undisputed Sense of the Nation.

This Author does indeed allow the Case of the *Dutch* to be extremely dangerous, as they have set forth in their Declaration of War; but then he says, *The Grounds of their Quarrel are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other Prince or State; and that they were nearest and most exposed to the Fire.* What then? Were not we near enough to be burnt, because they were a little nearer? Men that can remember that Juncture of Affairs, must own they could not think of it without trembling, the Danger was so extremely great; and what is very remarkable, 'tis probable nothing saved *Holland* so much as the Backwardness *England* shew'd to come into the War. *France* hop'd we should be content to lie still, if they did not press too hard upon *Holland*, and that Consideration diverted the Storm, and gave them time to make Alliances, and provide for their Defence; but the very sight of so near a Danger was sufficient to convince us it was not our Business to lie still, but to rouse our  
selves



selves while we could, since such an *exorbitant Power*  
 might at any time execute the Destruction it then  
 threatned; and when they shall ever be ruin'd, our  
 Turn is next; and next to the nearest sure is near  
 enough, though this Author would perswade us, we  
 are no more concern'd to be one of the *Principals* in  
 this War than *Prussia*, or any other Power that came  
 afterwards into that Alliance; than which nothing  
 can be more false, unless the Preservation of *Great-*  
*Britain* be of no more Consequence, than that of a little  
 Dukedom or petty State. Shall we be no more con-  
 cern'd at the *exorbitant Power* of *France*, which brings  
 our *Liberty* and *Trade* into the utmost danger, than  
 People who have neither Liberty nor Trade to be con-  
 cern'd for, and can suffer little by the Change, whatever  
 Masters they are under? Is the Preservation of *England*,  
 which is the great Support of the Protestant Reli-  
 gion, of no Consequence? And if it be, shall we  
 not think it in Danger from *France*, because some  
 other States have nothing to apprehend upon this  
 Head, as being of the same Religion with the *French*?  
 But suppose all other Princes and States in the Al-  
 liance as much expos'd to *France* by the Usurpation  
 of the *Spanish* Monarchy as our selves; what if they  
 are so feeble that they can't help themselves, or so  
 indolent that they won't, or that they are govern'd  
 by a Faction in the *French* Interest, must we therefore  
 be insensible of our Danger, or not exert our selves  
 to prevent it? By this Author's Argument, *Prussia*,  
*Savoy*, *Portugal*, or any other small State, should  
 contribute as much to the War as *Great-Britain*,  
 because they are as much interested in it; and if  
 more, they should contribute more. Those who must  
 in course be the greatest Sufferers, ought, he says, to  
 bear the greatest Weight, without considering their  
 Strength. And this he illustrates by a very apt  
 Comparison: If a House be on fire, the Owner is sure

to be undone first, and it is not impossible that those at next Door may escape by a Shower from Heaven, &c. Lord have Mercy upon us, if this is all we have to trust to. 'Twould be a pretty Sight when a House is on Fire, to have a Consultation held in the Neighbourhood what each should do towards extinguishing it, and if it should be seriously debated how many Buckets and Hands each should employ, and the Council should end in this wise Resolve, that the Number of Buckets and Hands should be in exact Proportion to the Nearness each was at to the House where the Fire began. This is so ridiculous a Rule, that it would be impossible to be comply'd with, unless Peoples Abilities also were exactly proportion'd to the Nearness of the Danger; and if no body would do their part, or more than their part, till the rest of their Neighbours did theirs, I humbly conceive the whole Neighbourhood would be burnt out. Suppose a *Lord*, a *Merchant*, a *Draper*, a *Mechanick*, and a poor *Alms-house* were next to one another; that a Fire broke out in this last, and the *Lord's* House particularly were next the Water, would not any body think this *Lord* a Mad-man, who had a great Number of Servants about him, and more Buckets perhaps than the whole Street, if he would not suffer a Bucket to be touched, or a Hand to stir, till the poor *Alms-Women* had furnish'd their part, in proportion to the Danger, though they have not perhaps one Servant nor one Bucket, and must inevitably perish without Help? Or shall he stay to see this House burnt, and the next on Fire, and whether the *Mechanick* and the rest do their part, for Fear of doing more than his Share? If what this Author advances concerning other States, to prove that we should do no more, be Sense, so is this; and if this be not Sense, no more is the other. 'Tis his own Comparison, and there is in the

the Cases no Difference. If a House is in so much Danger of Fire, that nothing can save it but a Shower from Heaven, a Man must be mad that won't do all he can to extinguish it; and so are we if we don't exert our selves to our utmost, in case our Danger be as great.

But because the Danger was nearest *Holland*, our Author thinks we ought to have acted only as *Auxiliaries*: This is so extraordinary a Reason, that if it be good, it must destroy all Alliances. If *England* ought not to have enter'd into the *Grand Alliance*, because *Holland* was more concern'd, no more should any other Power in *Europe*, since neither the Dangers nor the Abilities of any two States can be exactly equal; and therefore there can be no Allowance where all Parties shall be *Principals*. Tho' in the last War this Writer allows the *Empire*, *England* and *Holland*, were all *Principals*, and he does not pretend to find any Fault with it. I must observe, that a Year ago the Cant of the Party was not settled, nor were they agreed what Sense certain Words were to be used in; for in the *Letter to the Examiner*, *Principals* is opposed to *Confederates*, and means the engaging further than any of the other *Confederates*, in the Expence and Burden of the War; but no Fault is there found with our entring into the *Grand Alliance*; on the contrary 'tis commended: but here in this Writer, *Principals* is taken in a new Sense, and opposed to *Auxiliaries*: By which the Author means, that we ought not to have gone into the *Grand Alliance* at all, but contented our selves to assist *Holland* with ten thousand Men only, according to an old Treaty; this, he says, would have been prudent and generous, and that the States demanded no more. True, they did not demand more, because we were by no Treaty then in being oblig'd to do more for them; but where is the Generosity of fur-



nishing this small Quota according to the Treaties we were bound by? Or where would have been the Prudence in giving an Assistance that must needs come to nothing? But our Author, who with his Friends is greatly skilled in foreign Affairs, *makes no doubt but Holland, with that Assistance alone, would have been able to defend their Frontiers*; and if they could not, he makes no doubt in the second place, *but the Spaniards would not have suffered the French to possess themselves of Flanders*. Now I in my turn *make no doubt*, but this Author is convinced as much as I am, that all this is egregious Nonsense: First, to fancy that the *Spaniards* would hinder the *French* from possessing themselves of *Flanders*, when by the Treachery of the Elector of *Bavaria* they were at that time in one Night put into the actual Possession of all the strong Places in it. When this Author writes again, I desire the Favour of him to let us know, which way they could have been dispossest'd? And his other Fancy is still more absurd, that *Holland*, who could not in conjunction with *England* and *Spain* keep their *Frontiers* last War, should now be able to defend themselves when their Frontier is lost, against the united Force of *France* and *Spain*, with no other Assistance from *England* but that poor one of ten thousand Men. And as if these two ridiculous Assertions wanted no other Proof, but were as plain as first Principles, by help of this short Charm, *I make no doubt*, he gravely infers from them, *That there was no sort of Necessity for us to proceed farther, although we had been in a better Condition; but our Politicians had other Views, a Grand Alliance was therefore to be made between the Emperor, England, and the States-General*. Well is it for us our Politicians then were not of the Size of those who now prescribe to us; since it has been shewn to the greatest degree of Evidence, that the War was necessary, and that nothing could have been  
been

been so fatal to us, as to sit still and look on, while *France* was over-running the rest of the World. Nothing was so much for the Service of *France* as this nonsensical Doctrine of *Auxiliaries*, since upon the same Foot they would have acted as *Auxiliaries* to the Duke of *Anjou*; by which means *Holland* and the *Emperor* would soon have been out of Breath, and must, by their own Submission to *France*, have shewn us the way to submit too: For had not we come into the War, neither of those Powers could have held out another Campaign; and what would have been the Consequence? Should we suffer them to be over-run? Or should we then think fit to help them? If the last was for our Interest, sure it was much more to our Purpose to help them in time, when our Assistance could be of some use, and not when they had exhausted themselves beyond recovering, by exerting their Strength all at once, and that without Success, as it must have been against a Power that was so much an Over-match: For this Author has before told us, That the Ballance was alter'd since the last War no less than *one hundred thousand Men on the side of France*, and the Ballance he owns was much too strong on that side before. And yet the same Author who says this would make us believe *Holland* and the *Emperor* might have been a Match for *France* by themselves. Men must be strangely in love with Contradictions, that can take up with such Stuff as this. The Plain of the Case is this: The Power of *France* was so exorbitant, that if *England* won't engage in the War, the Liberty of *Europe* must be lost, let the other two Powers do what they will. If they hazard a War, they are so over-match'd, that it can end in nothing but the Ruin of them: If for fear of an ill War, they leave *France* in the quiet Possession of their Usurpations, they must resolve to submit to such Conditions as shall be imposed on them.

Nothing

Nothing could hinder this but a vigorous Union of all the Allies ; and if it were done at all, it must be done at first, without giving the Enemy time to take the proper Methods to secure the Possession of what they had usurped. This was the only Part these Powers could take to rescue the expiring Liberty of *Europe*, and *England* wisely came into it, as the only possible way to secure their *Religion*, *Trade*, *Government*, and what is the only lasting Security of all the rest, the *Protestant Succession*. And this was so far from being a hasty Step in *England*, that it had like to have been delayed too long ; for tho' the King of *Spain* died the 1<sup>st</sup> of *November* N. S. 1700. the Parl—t in being was dissolved, by whose Advice I desire this Writer to inform us, by which means the King was disabled from giving any Assurances of Assistance to the Elector of *Bavaria*, and that determin'd the latter to throw himself upon *France*, and betray to them the whole *Spanish Netherlands*. The new Parl——t did not meet till *February*, about ten Days after the *Netherlands* were given up, 'twas almost the end of the Session before they advised the King to make Alliances ; and the end of that Year another Parl—t was called, who approved the Advice of the former, and War was not actually proclaimed till *May* 4, 1702. about two Months after the King's Death. What now is there in this that can be said to be hasty or precipitate ? When did any State deliberate so long in a case of so much Danger ? What odds was it but the *Emperor* had been beat in *Italy*, and *Holland* had been made a Province to *France* ? 'Twas what all Men will allow *France* might have done, and it was Infatuation they did not : But if they had done what they had in their Power to do, what had become of our wise and mature Deliberations ? What then can be more false or impudent than to say as this Author does,



does, *That without offering at any other Remedy, without taking time to consider the Consequences, or to reflect on our own Condition, we hastily engaged in a War that hath cost us 60 Millions.*

But to proceed, As this Author declares our Entrance into the War to be *against all manner of Prudence or common Reason*; so he undertakes to prove that *England* is not obliged to pursue the Ends of it; or rather that the *Restitution of Spain* is not one of those ends. *The Queen's Declaration of War*, he tells us, *does not take notice of the Duke of Anjou's Succession to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel.* This he says, p. 22. & p. 16. he gives us a part of this Declaration. Now the Grand Design of this Book being to persuade the Nation to an ill Peace against the Consent of their Allies, and the Sense of Justice and Honour, which have always govern'd our Parliaments in Matters which the Dignity of the Crown and the Reputation of their Country are concerned in, being a great Obstruction to such pernicious Measures, to remove the Scruples that will arise in honest Minds, this Author labours this second Point extremely, and is at abundance of Pains to explain away the Sense and Meaning of the Treaties we are under. An ill Peace is what the whole Scheme of the Author aims at, this is the great Point which all his others center in, which he hopes thus to bring about. 1. To go into the Grand Alliance was wrong in it self. 2. The Terms of it don't oblige us to insist upon the *Restitution of the Spanish Monarchy.* 3. The Allies are a Pack of Rogues, and if this was stipulated in the Articles of the *Grand Alliance*, they not having performed their Parts, we are not obliged to stand to it. Is not this a noble Scheme? Who now can scruple consenting to a Separate Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies*? What Difficulty can any one make against giving up such Allies?

Allies? How can we think our selves bound by what is not expressly mentioned in the Articles of our Treaties with them? And in a doubtful Case how can we be so nice in departing from an Alliance, which we ought not at first to have entered into? This is the Scheme contrived to break the *Grand Alliance*, and I will undertake by the same Arguments to undermine the Revolution, which Purpose this Scheme will with little Alteration as well serve, as that 'tis now used for. And I doubt not but in a little time it will; our Author having given us a plain Intimation he has it in his Thoughts, as soon as he has enabled his Friends to carry the first great Point of an *ill Peace*. For what else can be the meaning of that scandalous Intimation he gives of this, p. 39. That the *Legislature* may have occasion to change the *Succession*, if the *Necessities of the Nation* may require it. Till this Author tells us what those *Necessities* can be, and proves the *Legislature* have such a Power, I humbly beg leave to tell him, there can be no such *Necessities*, except what his Friends shall create us by an *ill Peace*; nor have the *Legislature*, I conceive, Power to change the *Succession in the House of Hanover*, without such *Necessities*, it being made by the *Union* a Fundamental Article, which our *Representatives* are chosen to preserve, but have no Power to destroy; but I shall have more occasion to speak of this, when I come to consider the *Barrier-Treaty*, by which the *Succession* is secured, and which for this Reason chiefly I presume our Author is so angry at, and makes so many Objections against, every one of which I promise to shew, is malicious, and ridiculously false.

But to return, Of the three Parts of which this noble Scheme consists, I think I have pretty well confounded the first, and shewn it was not wrong for *England* to go into the *Grand Alliance*; but that on the

the contrary it was highly reasonable and absolutely necessary. I come now to shew there is as little Sense or Reason in what he advances in Proof of his second Point: but beg leave first to observe, That if all his three Points were fully proved, they don't prove what they are brought for. For if our Treaties don't oblige us to insist on the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and our Allies don't deserve it of us? Shall we therefore be false to our selves, because we need not be true to them? Shall we make a Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies*, in the Restitution of which we have our selves the greatest Interest, because the House of *Austria* have not done so much as we expected, tho' perhaps they did all they could? Shall we not insist upon a good Barrier for the *Dutch*, or rather shall we oblige them to quit that which they have Possession of, because some Men are not pleased with them, and therefore take a great deal of Pains to make us out of Humour with the best Ally we ever had or can have, and who instead of being false to us, have this War outdone themselves, and shewn the most generous Concern for the Interest of *England*; but supposing all that this Writer says of them were true, shall we expose our selves to Danger for the Pleasure of exposing them? Shall not we insist on a good Barrier, because we are told they don't deserve of us all we have done towards it? Shall we lay our selves open to all the Consequences of an insecure Peace, and in complaisance to the old inveterate perpetual sworn Enemy of our Religion and Country, sacrifice our selves as well as our Allies, by receding from the essential Points of a good and lasting Peace? If this won't follow from our Author's Propositions, as 'tis certain it will not, all he endeavours to prove, in truth proves nothing as to the main Point, which is all is aimed at. For tho'



our Honour might be disengaged, our Interest is not, the Safety of *England* and *Holland* especially are inseparably interwoven, and neither can stand long without the other.

Having shewn the Reader in few Words, how wide a Difference there is between this Author's Conclusion and his Premises, and that tho' the last were proved, the other would remain to be proved as much as ever; I come now to shew, that the second is absolutely false, and that *England* is obliged by her Treaties to insist on the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy*, particularly of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To prove this we need only look into the Words of the Treaties themselves. This is so evident in the Treaties with *Savoy* and *Portugal*, that there is not so much as a Pretence for denying it. And I would be glad to know why the Articles of these Treaties are not as obligatory as those of the *Grand Alliance*. I am sure there is one Reason why they shou'd be more, and that is, that when the *Grand Alliance* was made, the Allies were in the utmost Consternation. The sudden Invasion and Seizure of the whole *Spanish Monarchy* made the Danger that threatned them appear so terrible, that any Terms while they were in that Fright, which a most unjust Usurpation had put them into, seem'd tolerable. And therefore their true Sense can't be so well judged by what they did then, as when they were come a little to themselves, and a good Campaign in *Flanders* had made them think they were in a better Condition to make a stand, than they could hope to be, when the *French* were under the Walls of *Nimeguen*. This gives a greater Validity to the subsequent Treaties, than to that of the *Grand Alliance*, and the true Sense of the Allies can be much better seen by them. Besides that General Articles are to be explain'd by particular ones,

ones, and not particular ones by such as are conceived in general Terms. And therefore the best way to know what is meant by *an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction to the Emperor for his Pretension to the Spanish Monarchy*, is to see how the Allies have expressed themselves in their other Treaties, which Treaties can on no pretence be called the Contrivance of a Faction, having been made in the 2<sup>d</sup> Year of the War, when all Places of Trust were in the Hands of Men most zealously affected to the Church, and the Parliament perfectly of a piece with them. So that there can be no room for weakning the Force and Authority of Treaties made before this pretended Faction was formed, or so much as thought of, no body pretended to complain of wrong Measures, every body was pleased with the Restoration of Credit, the Successes of the War, and the wise and frugal Management of the Treasury. It may therefore justly be presumed, that no Treaties were better consider'd, or more prudently entred into by her Majesty than those with *Savoy and Portugal*, in which the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* to King *Charles* is expressly stipulated. But what puts this Matter past all Dispute, and undeniably proves that the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy*, especially of *Spain* and the *Indies*, is no new Incident, started since the Grand Alliance, as this Author pretends, is the first Separare Article of the Grand Alliance in 1689, wherein *England and Holland* engage, *That in case the King of Spain should die without Issue, they will with all their Forces assist his Sacred Imperial Majesty, or his Heirs, in taking the Succession of the Spanish Monarchy lawfully belonging to that House.* Is this now a new Incident, when it appears 'tis what the Allies obliged themselves to a dozen Years before; is this the Work of a late Faction,

which is plainly as old as the *Revolution* ? And since the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy is so expressly articulated for in our Treaties both before and since the Second Grand Alliance, shall we pretend 'twas not ever intended by the Allies, nor within the Meaning of the Grand Alliance, but the Contrivance of a Faction here to perpetuate the War, because 'tis not in so many Words express'd, but only that *an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction* shall be procur'd the Emperor for his Pretension to the *Spanish* Succession ? Is it not apparent, that this was always the Design of the Allies, though it was not at the time of the Treaty thought proper to be so express ? And don't this Writer know what the Reasons were for their expressing themselves as they did ? Had not *England* and *Holland* been frighted into an Acknowledgment of the Duke of *Anjou*, tho' in a very private, obscure, unauthoritative way ? And did not the Apprehension they were then under make them think it impossible to recover the whole Monarchy, tho' they thought it just and necessary for their own Defence ? But when People think themselves upon the Brink of Ruin, they are glad to compound on any Terms ; and would *France* have taken them at that Advantage, and hearkned to an Accommodation, they would, to prevent a War which seem'd so hazardous, have given up many Points which they had Right to insist on, and ought to do, as soon as they felt their Ground, and were in a Condition to support their just Pretences by their Sword : 'Twas the particular Circumstances of that frightful Juncture, and nothing else, that made the Allies express themselves in such general Words, which they reserved to themselves the Power of explaining ; and have both by previous and subsequent Treaties sufficiently shewn their true Meaning



ing and Intention. If God should bless their Arms, 'tis evident they thought the Restitution of the whole Monarchy ought to be insisted on as the Emperor's Right, and necessary for their own Defence.

It appears then that this Resolution against any Peace without Spain, which, he says, is a new Incident GRAFTED upon the Original Quarrel by the Intrigues of a Faction, is an express Article of the first Grand Alliance; and that I take to be the proper Place to look for the Grounds of our Original Quarrel. This new Incident is also grafted in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Article of the Alliance between the Emperor, England, Portugal, and Holland; and in the 6<sup>th</sup> Article of her Majesty's League with the Duke of Savoy. This new Incident has likewise been five times grafted in her Majesty's Speeches from the Throne, or Answers to the Addresses of Parliament. It has been four times grafted in the Addresses of the House of Commons; and five times in those of the House of Lords; and by Both our Parties successively. This new Incident was grafted in the Preliminary Articles concluded by the Ministers of the Allies with those of the French King in the Year 1709; and it was grafted in the Resolution of the States in the Year 1710, in which the other Allies concurr'd. So that if this new Incident, which her Majesty her self says, was the chief Inducement of the War, or of this Author's Original Quarrel, has since been grafted upon it by the Intrigues of a Faction, as he ingenuously observes, her Majesty, her Parliaments, and her Allies, are the Faction that have done it. And is not this now a very modest and judicious Reasoner, fit to be employ'd in writing for such a Peace? Not to mention that quaint Expression of grafting an Incident upon a Quarrel, because we must always expect to meet with

with those Tinsel Figures, when such Men or their Masters will be scribbling about Politicks; but shall the Resolutions of Both Houses, confirm'd by the Queen, be call'd by such Writers *the Intrigues of a Faction*? What will become of our Constitution, if the most sacred Sanctions of it are to be treated in so insolent a manner? Nay, what will become of the Nation it self? Who will treat with us, or trust us? And what a Figure shall we make in *Europe*, if as often as Alterations are made at Court, those that come into Power shall pervert all that has been done by their Predecessors, and cancel the Resolutions of her Majesty and our Parliaments, which have been made by both Parties alternately, and in which they themselves have concurr'd?

To explain away the Meaning of all Treaties by the Help of a few general Words in one, which at the same time 'tis so easy to account for, is just as reasonable as the Pretence of the *Jacobites* and their Friends to destroy the Validity of the *Revolution* by virtue of a single Clause of *Non-Resistance*, in the famous Act of 12 Ch. II. in Contempt of, and in Contradiction to all the Laws made before and since in defence of the Rights of the People; as if it were fitter for the whole Body of our Laws to be explain'd away by Vertue of a few Words in a single Act made at an extraordinary Juncture, than that single Clause should be interpreted in a Sense agreeable to the Spirit of our Laws, and the very Fundamental of our Constitution. The *Revolution* will run in my Thoughts while I am upon this Argument, for I can't but fear, that the same Faction, that are in so much hast to overturn the *Grand Alliance*, mean no less to destroy the *Revolution*, and whether they do directly mean it or not, there is so close a Connexion between the two, that the con-

confounding of one will in all humane Probability draw after it the Subversion of the other. But had we no other Treaties to explain the general Words of the Treaty of the Grand Alliance by, the meaning of the Allies is sufficiently plain from the Articles of this very Treaty; for if they proposed nothing else to themselves but the procuring for the Emperor *Milan, Naples, and Sicily, the Lands upon the Coasts of Tuscany, and the Islands in the Mediterranean that belong to the Crown of Spain*, which is expressly covenanted for in the 5th Article, they would always have express'd themselves in that manner, and not made use of those general Words of *an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction*, under which *England and Holland* meant *Spain and the Indies*, which the Emperor knew was their Concern as much, or rather more, than his; and therefore if they were for certain Reasons content that *Spain* and the *Indies* should not be mentioned by Name, the Emperor was satisfy'd, as long as those Parts were named, in which his own Safety was most immediately involved. That the Allies intended to explain these Words, so as to take in the Restitution of the whole Monarchy, if they were in Condition to insist on it, is plain from hence, and has ever since been so understood; and no longer ago than last Year, the Author of the *Letter to the Examiner* so little dreamt of the Notions that have been started since, that he freely owns, That to restore the *Spanish Monarchy to the House of Austria*, was one of the *wise Motives of this War*. And the same thing is confessed by the Lords in their Representation in February last; and from thence we may be sure 'twas then the Sense of the M — y. And to take away all Possibility of a Pretence, that this was not a wilful and designed Corruption, a Satisfaction for the Emperor, and a Security for *England* and



and the *States*, is the Language that runs thro' the whole Treaty; and in the Article but just before this, we have these Words, *For obtaining the Satisfaction aforesaid for his Imperial Majesty, and the aforesaid Security for his Britannick Majesty and the States*. Can we suppose this Writer did not read the whole Treaty, or not so much as cast his Eye upon the Article immediately preceding this, which it was so much for his Purpose to pervert? No sure, this *Corruption* in so important an Article, must be allowed to be a Master-piece of Cunning, not the Work of a Vulgar Hand, or of a *Swift Pen*; and the Author with Reason thought himself safe from a Discovery by the very Greatness of the Crime, which is such, that a Man must be lost to all Honesty, before he can be suspected to be guilty of it.

But 'tis time to have done with this Argument; I shall now turn my self to my Author, and let the World see he is as good at corrupting Witnesses, and those not private ones, but the most publick and solemn Acts, as he is at imposing weak and false Reasonings, of which we have three scandalous Instances in a very small Compass: One in the Piece he gives us of the *Queen's Declaration of War*, and two others in the Translation of one single Article of the Grand Alliance. P. 16. he tells us, the *Queen's Declaration* is grounded on the Grand Alliance, and then gives this Extract of it, that it recites the *French King's keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish Dominions, seizing Milan, and the Spanish Low-Countries, &c.* Now in the Declaration between Spanish Dominions and seizing Milan, are these very remarkable Words, *exercises an absolute Authority over all that Monarchy, having seized Milan, &c.* Were these Words, does any body think, left out by chance, or for nothing? No, by no means; 'twas for our Author's Purpose to affirm, as he does, p. 22. that the *Q—n's*

*Declaration takes no notice of the Duke of Anjou's Succession to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel. But don't the Words I have quoted in effect say the thing, tho' they forbear the Name? They certainly do, and that no doubt was the true Reason they were left out. But our Author is not content to suppress a very material Part of one Evidence, but does in the most shameful manner falsify another in two Places of the 8th Article of the Grand Alliance, p. 68. first in these Words: Nor is Peace to be made without having first obtain'd a just and reasonable Satisfaction for his Casarean Majesty, and for his Royal Majesty of Great-Britain, and a particular Security to the Lords the States General, of their Dominions, Provinces, Titles, &c. Now the true Translation of the Original Words is this. No Peace shall be made unless an equitable and seasonable Satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms, Provinces, Dominions, &c. for his Majesty of Great Britain and the States General be first obtain'd; whence now arises this great Difference between the two Translations, was it because our Author did not understand the Original? Why then did he not give us this Article as 'tis translated in the general Collection of Treaties, which was much easier to do, than to be at the pains to translate so long an Article himself, had it not been to serve a Purpose. He would have us believe we had no Quarrel with France but his owning the Pretender, P. 16, 22. and other Places, which he thinks was a trifling Quarrel, and might easily have been made up. For the French Court declar'd they did not acknowledge the Pretender, but only gave him the Title of King which was allow'd by Augustus to the King of Sweden; how much Falsehood in so few Words! First what King Augustus was allow'd, was by Treaty; Secondly, He was not allow'd to*

style himself *King of Poland*, but *King only*; and therefore this is not applicable to the Case of the *Pretender*, who was styled not simply *King James*, as the other was *King Augustus*, but his *Britannick Majesty*, and *King of Great Britain*, for the Truth of which I refer to all the *Paris Gazettes* and other publick Papers. 'Tis therefore false to say he had only the Title of *King*, but was not acknowledged; but the Author's Scheme requir'd he should say this, and to support it, he translates the 8th Article in such a manner, as to make us think, nothing else was meant but that Satisfaction should be made the *King* for this *Indignity* and *great Affront* put on him. But if we let this Article speak its true Sense, it covenants for the Security of his Majesty's *Kingdom, Dominions, Navigation and Commerce*, as well as for those of the *States General*, the contrary to which this Author would feign have thought, both to reflect upon the *King*, and lessen as much as may be the particular Interest *England* has in the *Grand Alliance*.

So much for this Passage; the other is still more scandalous. A little lower in this Article, 'tis covenanted; *Particularly that the French may never be in Possession of the Spanish West Indies, and that they may not have the Liberty of Navigation for Convenience of Trade under any Pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of Great Britain and Holland may have full Power to use and enjoy all the same Privileges as they did use and enjoy at the time of the King of Spain's Death.* Would not any Man think by these Words that the *French* by this Article are no otherwise excluded from trading to the *Spanish West Indies*, but on Supposition that *England* and *Holland* are deny'd the Use and Enjoyment of the same Privileges they had formerly? And that if they are allow'd to use  
and



and enjoy those Privileges, that then the Exclusion of France from that Trade is at an end? This and nothing else can be the meaning of these Words, and it most admirably suited our Author's Design, which is to persuade us to suffer the French to have a free Trade to the Spanish West Indies, if they will allow us the same we had before, in direct Contradiction to the Interest of England, and the plain Sense of this Article, which ought to be, and in the Collection of Treaties is translated thus—*And particularly that the French shall never get into the Possession (or make themselves Masters) of the Spanish Indies, neither shall they be permitted to sail thither (or send any Ships thither) on the Account of Traffick (or to exercise Trade there) directly or indirectly on any Pretence whatsoever, there ends that Clause—*Then follows, *and lastly, (the said Peace shall not be concluded) unless full Liberty be granted to the Subjects of the King of Great Britain and the States General, to exercise and enjoy all the same Privileges, &c. as they did use and enjoy at the King of Spain's Death.* Thus we see it is an express and full Exclusion of the French from the Spanish Trade in the Indies upon any Pretence whatsoever. And a Peace made on other Terms will be made in Violation of a very material Article, which this Writer has the Impudence to falsify to that Degree, as to make it speak contrary to its true Meaning to cover Designs they dare not own.

But this Article, he says, was quoted to put the Matter out of Dispute: And so indeed it does: For if there were no other Article in all our Alliances, we are bound not to give Spain and the Indies to the House of Bourbon by this very Article which he has produced to justify it. The Article says, No Peace is to be made without a Security that France and Spain shall never be united: But if the House of Bourbon has both, what

possible *Security* can be given that they shall never be united? Is it impossible for the *Dauphin* or the Duke of *Anjou* to die without Children? And what then can hinder those Kingdoms from being united under one Prince, as they already are under one Management? Shall we depend upon a new Renunciation made by any of the Descendants in a right Line from *Lewis XIV*? I should be glad to see any of the Friends of *France* propose to us for Security a *French* Renunciation. This is I believe one of those few things which they will not have the Confidence to do.

But the Article says further, as I have already shewn, That no Peace shall be made till we have *Security that the French shall never be in Possession of the Spanish West Indies*: And I would fain know how we shall be secur'd of this, if *Spain* be given to the House of *Bourbon*. Are not the *French* at this time in Possession of the *Spanish West Indies*? Have they not Settlements there in *Lima* and other Places? Or have they promis'd our Negotiators of Peace, that for their sakes they will quit those Settlements? If they have not done this, and will not be as good as their Word, then I say, we cannot make Peace with them upon the Terms propos'd, if there were no Article against it but this, which is here judiciously referr'd to: We neither have, nor ever can have, a *sufficient Provision that France and Spain shall never be united*. And we are so far from being assur'd that *the French shall never be in Possession of the Spanish West Indies*, that we know they are possess'd of good Part of them already, and have more granted to them by a Treaty with the Duke of *Anjou* and his Grandfather; so that I might venture to put the whole Issue of the Dispute between this worthy Author and his Opponents upon the Construction of this single Article, which he has oblig'd

ged the World with a Translation of: Such an admirable Reasoner he is upon Matters of Fact! Nay, allowing all he contends for, that the *Allies demand no more for the Emperor and Great Britain than a just and reasonable Satisfaction*, I would even in this Case ask the Reader whether it is any more than a just and reasonable Satisfaction for the Emperor, that he should have those Dominions, which the King of *France* has solemnly renounc'd for himself and his Descendants, and which the House of *Austria* has an undoubted Right to? Is it any more than a reasonable Satisfaction for *Great-Britain*, that *France*, which has so lately broken two Treaties with us, that of *Ryswick*, and that of the *Partition*, should never be trusted again without effectual Security, nor left in a Condition to bring hither the Pretender? And can there be a sufficient Security to the States General, or to any other State in Christendom for their Dominions, when the exorbitant Power of *France* shall be strengthened by the Riches of the *Indies*? What! after this, will the *French* give, that when ever they please they cannot take away, and what will they leave that they can? How often must one repeat that the King of *France* governs his Grandson, which if he lives but three Years more will be enough to do our Business? And that in the mean time he has Treaties for Ports, for Forts, for Settlements, and for Trade, which are already executed? What therefore do these Peace-makers mean by telling us of a *reasonable Satisfaction*, or a *sufficient Security*, without *Spain* and the *Indies*? These Arguments are so noisy, and yet so empty; so weak, and yet so sufficient; so florid, and yet so senseless, that God forbid the chief Director of the Work should be trusted alone with any cunning *Frenchman*, tho' his Intentions were never so zealous  
for



for the Interest and Safety of his own Country.

Thus has this useful Author explain'd an Article in one Treaty; and I doubt not but we shall find him acting with the same Sincerity in the Account he gives of other Treaties when we come to look into them: But that I have not now time for.

Having sufficiently discover'd the wicked Design of this vile Book, and pointed at general Solutions of almost all the Fallacies 'tis filled with; and given such ample Proof of the Writer's Integrity and Honesty, which has swelled these Papers much beyond my Expectation, I shall reserve my particular Answers to the several Facts alledged for a second Part, which shall be publish'd in very few Days; and in it shall be fully consider'd all that the *Partizans* of France have said, or can say against the *Allies* and the late M——y. In the mean time I desire all honest and impartial Men to suspend their Judgments, and not hastily believe upon this infamous Author's bare Word, that we are under any real Necessity of concluding, against the Consent of our Allies, and in Breach of so many Treaties, a most just, necessary and successful War, by a scandalous and insecure Peace.

FINIS.



